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26.1 Rules, Practices and Reasons
26.1.1 Main Features
The system of attorneys’ fees in the United States has two characteristic
features: (1) no fee-shifting (the “American rule”); and (2) fees set by agree-
ment between lawyers and clients unrestricted by law (“unregulated fee
agreements”).
American practice of no indemnity. The practice in America is that each
party pays his own lawyer her fee. Consequently losers do not make win-
ners whole through paying their attorneys’ fees. Winners recover less than
their full claims after they pay their lawyers. Although called the “American
Rule,” it is better named the American practice, since rarely is it compelled
by statute or precedent. It does not apply to court costs, which even in
America, by rule are shifted to losers.
Unregulated fee agreements. Attorneys’ fees are set by agreement of
lawyers and their clients. They are usually unregulated by fee schedules
or judicial determinations. Most common in the United States are hourly
fees, contingent fees in litigation, and flat charges for specific services.
Lawyers and their clients are free, however, to structure their fees using
a combination of these three elements in just about any way they wish.
26.1.2 American Exceptionalism
According to the General Report, the American practice of “open rejection
of the loser pays principle and the actual refusal to shift the lion’s share of
litigation expenses in the vast majority of cases sets the United States apart
from the rest of the systems covered here.” [1.2.1.3] That the “vast major-
ity of systems embrace the loser-pays principle ... reflects primarily an idea
of basic fairness ...: it seems just that the loser must compensate the win-
ner.” [1.2.3.1] In the asserted justification for fee rules, the General Report
advises, the United States stands apart: it is “the only country predicat-
ing its basic cost rule purely on instrumentalist grounds.” [1.2.3.3]2 When
it comes to fee agreements, according to the General Report, the United
They were drawn not to lambaste his work as a law reformer, but for his work for political
and business interests. He represented “Boss” Tweed of Tammany Hall, and Fisk and
Gould in the Erie railroad scandal. See Philip J. Bergan, David Dudley Field: A Lawyer’s
Life, in THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 21, 37–47 (1986). When Field died, Harper’s Weekly
noted his death by reprinting on the entire front page the painting of him by Robert
Gordon Hardie in the Hall of the Court of Appeals in Albany. 38 HARPER’S WEEKLY 361
(April 21, 1894).
2 The General Report observes that fairness arguments can be made in defense of Amer-
ican no-indemnity practice and singles out for mention the unpredictability of legal
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States is not alone. Other systems allow lawyers and clients to agree on
fees that are over and above fees shifted. Binding fee schedules are “on the
decline.” [1.3.2.2] The General Report speaks of “yet another ‘American-
ization’ of law in many parts of the world.” [1.3.2.2] The General Report
observes three costs in freeing fees from regulation: it is incompatible with
full fee shifting; it creates predictability and fairness issues; and it invites
second-stage litigation about what is a reasonable fee. [1.3.2.2]
According to the United States National Report, at one time, many Amer-
ican states, including New York, were within today’s worldwide norms. Fee
shifting and fee schedules were parts of the American legal landscape.3
According to David Dudley Field, Jr., the great reformer and lawyer sati-
rized in the three illustrations in this article, in 1842 it was a proposition
“which scarce anyone will object to ... that the losing party ought to indem-
nify the other so far as he can against his losses by the suit.”4 Only in
the second half of the nineteenth century did no indemnity become the
national norm and fee regulation and shifting disappeared.
The General Reporter invites the National Reporter to explain why the
United States rejects loser pays and the simple justice that stands behind
it. I accept the invitation. My explanation is subjective and tentative.
decisions. [1.2.3.3, Note 71] That argument rejects an underlying assumption of fee-
shifting, that law is workably certain. That the argument has traction in the United States
is attributable to the uncertainty of American law. In this conception, legal process is
more of a method for divining an authoritative decision than an application of law to
facts. On certainty and uncertainty, see James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty and Legal
Methods: A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 541 (2007); James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America:
American Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517 (2006).
3 James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
SUPP. 195, 216–219 (2010). See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American
Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9 (1984). Professor
Leubsdorf’s article remains the most insightful examination of fee and cost-shifting in
the United States. Specifically on the presence of fee schedules in early America, see
1 ANTON-HERMANN CHOUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 85–89,
129–132, 159–160, 317–319 (1965). On the decline and occasional revival see WILLIAM
G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS 9–17
(1996).
4 David Dudley Field, Letter, printed as Appendix To the report of the Committee on
the Judiciary, in relation to the more simple and speedy administration of justice,
STATE OF NEW-YORK, REPORT IN PART OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, IN RELA-
TION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENT NO. 81 (1842), at 55 collected
in 5 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK SIXTY-FOURTH [SIC,
65TH] SESSION (1842). [Bibliographic notes: the Appendix was sometimes distributed
separately from the whole committee report. The committee report is collected in the
documents series, in which each document is separately paginated. This volume is as of
this writing available as a Google book.]
290 J.R. Maxeiner
26.1.3 Lawyers Drive Civil Justice
The machinery by which justice is wrought out has always been, and must forever
remain, the creation of the profession. . . . No one thinks of challenging the right of
the bar to determine the methods of which the remedies affecting the profoundest
concerns of life shall be administered.
Charles M. Wilds
Address Before the Vermont State Bar Association (1894)5
That private lawyers are the driving force behind civil justice explains the
existence of the American practices of no indemnity for attorneys’ fees
and unregulated fee agreements. That lawyers are self-regulating explains
why these practices continue. That lawyers control the conduct of litigation
explains the great effect these practices have in the United States.
Self-regulating. Lawyers in the United States regulate themselves. With
respect to fees they are little constrained by supervisory laws or authorities,
even by those of their own making.6 Moreover, there are no government
bodies that have responsibility for the overall state of civil justice.7
Lawyers control litigation. Lawyers in the United States control the
course of civil litigation. Judges are by and large passive observers. Lawyers,
and not judges, define issues in disputed cases. They decide what evidence
to take. They call witnesses and question them. Lawyers even write the first
drafts of instructions that judges give to juries and of findings of fact and
conclusions of law that judges use to decide cases without juries.8
The American “rule” was never legislated; it grew up as a practice. There
is no rule; there is an absence of rules. In the absence of rules, practices
are unguided by binding direction. It is not completely accurate to say that
5 AN ADDRESS ON COMMON LAW PLEADINGS, BEFORE THE VERMONT BAR ASSOCIATION,
OCTOBER 9, 1894 (1894).
6 See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY
COST AMERICA 468–469 (2011) (“no profession is as exempt from societal control as is
the legal profession. . . . Lawyers’ self-regulatory power largely flows from the judiciary’s
seizure of control over the practice of law . . . to deprive legislatures of their historic
authority to regulate lawyers. . . .”).
7 The United States Department of Justice and the offices of the attorneys general of
the several states do not have responsibilities comparable to German and other similar
ministries of justice. Instead they function principally as lawyers for the government.
The United States Supreme Court and the supreme courts of the several states have
only limited oversight role over the state of civil justice and the regulation of lawyers.
They do not have the extensive supervisory responsibilities characteristic of a supreme
court with an administrative role such as that of the Supreme Court of Korea. They are
composed principally of former lawyers. Not to be lost sight of is that in America judges
are lawyers in judges’ robes. See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE
BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010).
8 See generally, JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYOOHO LEE & ARMIN WEBER, FAILURES OF
AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2011).
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the United States has rejected loser pays, for rejection assumes a conscious
choice. Better it is to say that American courts do not practice it.9
Practices do not need justification. The American practice of no indem-
nity, Professor Leubsdorf has shown, developed without one. “One of the
most curious features of the American rule in the nineteenth century,” he
writes, “was its almost total absence of justification.”10 Today’s justifica-
tions post-date the practices. They are practically apologies. The practices
persist, because they suit the needs of lawyers, and because no one has
legislated otherwise. Lawyers work in their world and in their world, it
is “natural” to obtain their fees from their clients.11 They would have to
move out of that world to create a system of fee shifting. Of course, that
lawyers remain in their world does not make them evil, it only makes them
ordinary.
Despite witticisms to the contrary, lawyers are people. Historically they
were, and today by-and-large still are, independent small businessmen. Like
small businessmen everywhere who are dependent on their businesses for
existence, they share two concerns: (1) that they have sufficient customers;
and (2) that those customers pay promptly and well. There is nothing cyn-
ical in this observation: altruism has its limits where personal existence is
at stake. Who would not steal bread if the alternative is to starve?12
The American practice of no indemnity responds to the first concern of
lawyers as businessmen: getting customers. It helps them bring clients in.
For lawyers’ clients it cuts the risks of suing nearly in half. If they lose,
they need pay only their own lawyers and not lawyers for opposing parties.
For lawyers, it is easier to collect fees from their clients or from judgments
subject to contingent fees, than to extract them from unwilling and possibly
insolvent vanquished parties. Should they lose, they need not explain to
clients the obligation to pay yet another lawyer’s fee.13
Unregulated fee agreements let lawyers control their financial destinies.
Lawyers take charge not only of the credit risks inherent in the choice
of clients, but of the terms of those risks, namely reliability, timing and
9 Cf. Acrambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 306 (1796) (“The general practice of the United
States is in opposition to [allowing attorneys’ fees]; and even if that practice were not
strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or
modified, by statute.”).
10 Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 28.
11 Id.
12 Salaried employees are no different than independent businessmen; only their con-
cerns differ due to their different circumstances. They care (1) whether their employer
is healthy, and (2) whether they continue to have a position with their employer. So
too is it for politicians. They care (1) whether their government stays in power, and (2)
whether they remain a part of that government. Lest we forget, it is true of law professors,
too. Their concerns are those of salaried employees.
13 Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 17.
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level of payment. They are not subject to outside constraints such as court
decisions on costs or willingness or ability of vanquished parties to pay.
At the outset of litigation lawyers can secure their investments through
arrangements with their clients.
That the bar finds these practices congenial is suggested by their absence
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 and in the discussions
that led up to the rules.14 The organized bar’s silence both before and since
1938 has been unbroken. None of the three principal national law reform
organizations, the American Law Institute, the Uniform Laws Commission,
and the American Judicature Society, seems ever to have substantially
addressed the practice of no indemnity. Such proposals as there have been,
have come from law reformers external to the bar.
In the Federal Rules of 1938, the bar achieved a long-sought goal: transfer
of responsibility for civil procedure from legislators to judges. That meant,
in practical effect, transfer to lawyers. Yet the rules have little to say about
costs or attorneys’ fees and nothing to say about fee regulation or fee-
shifting. If the bar had been dissatisfied with those practices, they would
have found place in the discussions. The bar did care in 1848 when New
York adopted the other icon of American civil procedure history, the New
York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848.
The New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848 addressed both fee reg-
ulation and fee shifting directly. The Code repealed all fee regulations, but
it retained fee shifting. The bar had long sought the former, while accord-
ing to Field, everyone then still believed in the latter. The drafters of the
1848 Code, led by Field, justified abolition of fee regulation as necessary
to protect freedom of contract between private parties. They rejected the
idea that lawyers are public officers, chosen to do public duties, and that
therefore their fees could be regulated.15 The drafters justified retention
of fee-shifting in the interest of justice. But compared to a proposal that
Field alone had made earlier in the decade, the fee-shifting provisions of
14 Neither issue seems to have come up substantively in the course of the drafting of the
1938 rules. There was a suggestion that they should: Philip M. Payne, Costs in Common
Law Actions in the Federal Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397, 430 (1934). I do not know of
any instance where these practices have come seriously under discussion in the estab-
lishment law reform organizations. Serious proposals have come from outside the bar.
See, e.g., MARIE GRYPHON, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, GREATER
JUSTICE, LOWER COST: HOW A “LOSER PAYS” RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM, CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT NO. 11 (December 2008).
15 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CODE OF
PROCEDURE 205 (1848). Accord, Field, Letter, supra note 4, at 55. In rejecting the
characterization as officers of the court, Field may have been provocative, but not
off the mark for the United States. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the
Court, 42 VANDERBILT L. REV. 39 (1989) (“the characterization [is] vacuous and unduly
self-laudatory. It confuses lawyers and misleads the public.”).
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the 1848 Code were substantially watered down, both as proposed by the
three-member drafting committee, and still more so, as adopted by the leg-
islature.16 Leubsdorf senses a compromise, but how and by whom, remains
unknown.17 The fee-shifting provision was soon criticized as having “obvi-
ously failed” to achieve its objective.18 Although the subsequent history
remains to be written, it is one of neglect of fee-shifting.
26.1.4 Pernicious Products of American Practices
Lawyer control of litigation magnifies the effect of the no indemnity prac-
tice and extends its impact beyond reduction in value of valid claims. It
destroys meritorious claims and promotes baseless ones. Through control
of litigation, lawyers can force opposing parties to devote resources to litiga-
tion; thanks to the no indemnity practice, those resources are forever lost.
In most cases the only substantial external check on lawyers’ wreaking such
havoc is the possibility that opposing parties retaliate.
At every step, parties must consider process costs. Even where there
is no deliberate intention to create expenses, it has long been true that
“unless the case involves a large amount of money [the] lawyer’s bill eats up
[the] judgment if obtained.”19 Every lawyer knows that in most cases, the
other side, if so inclined, has the ability to render a victory Pyrrhic. A party
16 Field’s 1842 proposal had mandatory fee-shifting as fixed percentages of judgment
amounts. The Commission’s 1848 draft code made fee-shifting discretionary using “may”
instead of “shall” and left percentage amounts blank for the legislature to fill in. The law
as adopted by the legislature made the court’s discretion explicit and limited its exercise
to “difficult or extraordinary cases.” Field’s 1842 proposal is: Field, Letter, supra note 4.
The Commission’s 1848 Report on costs is FIRST REPORT, supra note 15, at 204–12
(1848). The law adopted is: An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and
Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. LAWS 544, § 258. [Biblio-
graphic notes: 1842 Letter: The letter was sometimes distributed separately from the
whole committee report and the volumes of documents. The committee report with the
Appendix is collected in the documents series and is as of this writing available as a
Google book. 1848 First Report: some electronic and print-on-demand editions to the
First Report of the Commissions on Practice and Pleading are based on a hard copy in
the New York Public Library where a contemporary user had pasted over the original
sections relevant here §§ 262–263 the text of the law as adopted.]
17 Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 20.
18 HENRY WHITAKER, PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE CODES, ORIGINAL AND
AMENDED WITH AN APPENDIX OF FORMS 600 (1852).
19 D.C., Letter to the Editor, The Constitutional Convention, the Judiciary and the Bar,
NEW YORK TIMES, June 5, 1867. The General Report is misleading in suggesting that the
American system does not ever eat up more than 50% of the amount in controversy, if
that amount exceeds $100,000. I personally was involved in a second stage case over
costs of $10,000 where the amount of attorneys’ fees in the second stage for the $10,000
costs exceeded $100,000!
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prepared to spend money may not be able to buy a victory, but it can deny
the opposing party one.20 Parties, of course, do not always engage their
weapons of mass destruction. The practice is reminiscent of the Mutual
Assured Destruction doctrine (“MAD”) of Cold War days, where neither
side attacked the other, because of fear of final retaliation. That reticence
to use the weapon clouds the view of outside observers of a reality that is
all too well-known to insiders.
The public seems resigned to destruction of meritorious claims; it may
assume that litigation costs are inevitable. The public takes greater notice,
however, of baseless claims that are enabled by no indemnity and lawyer
control.21 This combination permits weak parties with weak claims to
extract settlements even from strong parties with strong defenses.22 It
enables strong parties with weak claims to bully weaker parties with strong
defenses into surrendering their claims entirely.23 While scholars may
argue over the extent of the resulting distortions, about the totality of effect,
or whether there are countervailing benefits, no one who has spent even a
short time in litigation practice will reasonably deny that these distortions
are routine features of American civil justice.
26.2 Exceptions and Variations: The Common Denominator
The General Report notes exceptions and variations to the American prac-
tice of no indemnity. No common theory supports them.24 There is, how-
ever, one common denominator: helping lawyers get well-paying clients.
Three variations – contingent fee, one-way fee shifting, and class action
litigation – help lawyers gain clients who otherwise would be unable to
20 Cf., id. (“A man is painted naked, with a large bundle of papers under his arm, and
saying, ‘I, who won the suit, am now stripped to the skin; what then, must be the fate of
him who lost it?’ It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this evil; it has been felt too keenly
by everyone engaged in legal proceedings to be forgotten.”).
21 A notorious example is Pearson v. Chung, 961 A.2d 1067 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008) (law-
suit against dry cleaner claiming $67 million in damages for a lost pair of pants).
A new documentary film, Hot Coffee, challenges the assertion that another notorious
case, Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. D-202 CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. August 18, 1994), is a baseless case taking
advantage of the system. See http://hotcoffeethemovie.com/.
22 According to the General Report, it is “the implicit encouragement of weak lawsuits
(often with the sole goal to force the defendant to settle) – that sets the rule in the United
States apart from pretty much the rest of the world.” [1.2.3.3]
23 In 2010 Congress directed the Patent and Trademark Office to study the issue of
trademark bullying. The Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–146, 124 Stat. 66 (2010).
24 Leubsdorf sees “a bizarre variety of opinions, which might go far to justify the view
that policy analysis is totally arbitrary and manipulable.” Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 28.
26 The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share 295
afford their services. Two variations – pro se representation and legal aid –
help lawyers divert pressures to take on undesirable clients, i.e., free rid-
ers who would not pay well or at all. Finally, the exception to fee shifting –
indemnity for costs – has been neutralized as a factor that might discourage
clients by making costs trivial in most cases. We start with the exception
of costs (26.2.1); we then proceed to variations that encourage desirable
clients, i.e., business development (26.2.2); and we conclude with varia-
tions that help lawyers divert undesirable business to other providers, i.e.,
avoiding free riders (26.2.3).
26.2.1 Costs: Loser Pays (in Theory), as Elsewhere
For court costs, the rule (not a mere practice) in the United States is the
same as elsewhere: loser-pays. The rule dates from the colonial era when
lawyers were few and were not self-regulated. Costs discourage customers.
While costs have never been abolished, lawyers have kept them low.25
Unlike in many countries, court costs in the United States are set with-
out regard to amounts in dispute. For example, filing a lawsuit in federal
court seeking $100,000 in damages requires that plaintiff pay $350.26 In
Germany, for a case of comparable magnitude, €75,000, plaintiff must pay
€1,968 (or around $2,500) in costs.27 Increase the claim ten-fold and the
filing fee in Germany rises to €11,118 (around $15,000); in the United
States, the filing fee is still $350. Moreover, thanks to inflation, sometimes
what once were significant costs, now are trivial.28 Although court costs
are low, sometimes additional costs ancillary to the case, for example for
court-appointed experts (rarely used) can be high.
Application after trial of the loser-pays costs rule is unusual because
there are so few trials. More commonly it appears only after a pre-trial
motion. Only about 2% of cases go to trial. Unlike elsewhere, the trial
judge does not automatically calculate costs and include them in the judg-
ment. Instead the winning party must apply for costs and complete itemized
requests. Since total costs are low, often application is too burdensome to
bother with. Other times, it is easier just to include a rough estimate in the
discount usually given for prompt, voluntary payment of a judgment.
The original justification for shifting costs was the same as for attor-
neys’ fees: it is just that parties in the right be made whole. Attorneys’
25 See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 14.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
27 http://www.prozesskostenrechner.de/.
28 For example, in 1853 the federal courts introduced a case fee of $20. It was originally
intended as the attorney’s fee. The federal courts still have the same case fee and it is
still $20. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 21–22.
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fees were considered costs. Today, insofar as costs are discussed, the jus-
tification given for cost-shifting may just as well be the policy ground of
discouraging litigation. When they are held low, on the other hand, the jus-
tification given likewise will be a policy one, but this time, to encourage
litigation.
26.2.2 Business Development
They Do Each Other Honor
Mr. ∗∗∗∗∗ (the Most Ancient Fraud). “Your fame has reached beyond this cold world,
and I have come to ask you to defend Me.”
Thomas Nast, HARPER’S WEEKLY MAGAZINE, 152 (Feb. 24, 1877)29
The American practice of no indemnity is not a complete solution to over-
coming customer reluctance to buy into lawsuits. American lawsuits are
expensive. The General Report finds that fact gathering in the United States
is more expensive than anywhere else in the world. It reports:
29See ALEXANDER TABARROK, TWO CHEERS FOR CONTINGENT FEES (2006) (book
description: “If America is a lawsuit hell, then contingent-fee lawyers are often con-
sidered its devils.”).
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The practical impact of not shifting the lion’s share of evidence costs (including
expert witness fees) is tremendous: it entails a huge burden for the victor as well
as a huge relief for the vanquished. In fact, not shifting the bulk of evidence costs
is perhaps the defining feature that separates the United States from all other
jurisdictions covered here.
Ordinary people cannot afford the huge burden.30 At the outset of the law-
suit, they have to advance their lawyers a substantial part of the attorneys’
fee. At the conclusion of the lawsuit, they have to turn over a substantial
part of the award to their attorneys.
Once lawyers were freed to agree with their clients on fees, they could
design contractual and other solutions to lift the burden from ordinary
people and turn them into well-paying clients. The door was open to innova-
tive arrangements designed by lawyers to turn ordinary people into paying
customers. First came contingent fees designed for people with large open-
ended claims. Then came one-way fee-shifting for ordinary people with
claims newly created by statute. Then last came class actions for ordinary
people with mundane claims too small to be handled alone profitably.
26.2.2.1 Contingent Fees
The General Report observes that contingent fee agreements are widely
considered “a hallmark of the US-American legal system.” The essence of
a contingent fee agreement is that the lawyer’s fee is due if, and only if,
the lawyer achieves a favorable result. The fee is usually a percentage of
the amount recovered. Typically that amount is 33%.31 The contingent fee
agreement may provide that the lawyer advances court costs and other
expenses to the client to be paid or not paid later as the parties agree.
Ordinary people benefit at both key points of the lawsuit. At the outset,
they do not have to advance fees that they do not have. At the conclusion,
they do not have to pay at all if they lose; if they win, they do not have
to pay more than they recover. The huge burden and risk are taken on by
the lawyer. The downside for the client is that the lawyer’s share is high,
especially in those cases that do not incur the high costs of litigation.
Lawyers benefit from contingent fee arrangements by gaining clients that
they would not otherwise have. They are compensated for taking on the
process risk by being given a share of the recovery. In well-chosen cases,
that recovery may vastly exceed the investment in services provided. They
are able more surely and easily to collect their fees from judgments than
from winning or losing parties.
30 See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 31.
31 Jeffrey D. Swett, Determining a Reasonable Percentage in Establishing a Contin-
gency Fee: A New Tool to Remedy and Old Problem, 77 TENN. L. REV. 653, 655 (2010);
see generally, HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 9–10 (2004).
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Contingent fees became widely used in the second half of the nineteenth
century after lawyers were freed to agree with their clients on fees. The
practice of contingent fees was and is controversial, because it gives lawyers
financial interests in their cases.32 It is distasteful because it makes civil
justice – which is about determining rights to resolve controversies – into
cost/benefit risk decisions.33 It is troubling because in large cases it can
lead to enormous fees out of all proportion to time or risk invested – fees of
$40 million have been reported.34 Dissatisfaction with contingent fees has
engendered spotty regulation with haphazard enforcement.35
The justification given for contingent fees is that they provide ordinary
people with access to civil justice. Contingent fees, however, can only be a
partial solution to access to justice. Contingent fees help only some clients.
These are usually clients who as plaintiffs seek monetary relief and have
large and open-ended claims.36 Claims for fixed sums are less-desired, since
they make transparent the costs of the contingent fee arrangement. Claims
that are open-ended make the arrangement into a sharing of good for-
tune. This explains why tort claims are nearly all contingent fee based,
but contract claims are not.
Contingent fees do not facilitate representation when claims are too
small to generate sufficient revenues. Innovative Americans lawyers found
solutions that helped them make representation in these cases possible and
profitable as well. We turn now, first to one-way fee shifting statutes (Sec-
tion 26.2.2.2 below), and then to aggregate or class action litigation (Section
26.2.2.3 below).
26.2.2.2 Only in America: One-Way Fee-Shifting37
What are lawyers to do with cases that do not lead to monetary recoveries
or only to small ones insufficient to support their fees? One way would be to
32 Compare EDWIN COUNTRYMAN, THE ETHICS OF COMPENSATION FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES: AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE ALBANY LAW SCHOOL AND AN ANSWER TO
HOSTILE CRITIQUES (1882) with LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR
CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA (2011). See generally, Peter Karsten,
Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee
Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1997). Acceptance of contingent
fees presupposes loosening or ending historic limitations on lawyers having financial
interest in their cases.
33 John A. Day, Should you risk taking the case?, TRIAL, January 2008, at 20.
34 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Miller, 48 A.D.3d 1, 853 N.Y.S.2d 1(2007) (upholding a $40
million dollar, 40% contingency fee, which in the view of the dissent amounted to a
nearly 100% fee).
35 See Swett, supra note 31, 659 et seq.
36 See Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 207–209.
37 It’s not quite only in America; the General Report notes that there is also one-way
fee-shifting in Japan in personal injury cases. [1.2.2.1]
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abandon the American practice of no indemnity and adopt the global norm
of loser-pays. That would, however, drive away customers who are unable
to accept the risks posed by a loser pays rule.
The American legal system offers an ingenious solution: one-way fee
shifting. If lawyers win for their clients, opposing parties pay their legal
fees. On the other hand, if they lose for their clients, although they are
not paid at all, at least their clients do not have to pay the attorneys’ fees of
the opposing parties. Used first in the last third of the nineteenth century to
facilitate private enforcement of trade regulations,38 the idea has been a hit.
Hundreds of statutes direct that losing defendants pay fees of winning plain-
tiffs’ lawyers, while leaving winning defendants to pay their own lawyers’
fees.39 One way fee-shifting remains concentrated in private enforcement
of public law norms and does not extend to the historic private law.
One-way shifting is said to enlist private parties to act as “private attor-
neys general” in the enforcement of public law norms.40 In a nation that
is devoted to equality of treatment, in a profession that promotes fair con-
tests, the challenges that such a “heads I win, tails you lose” rule poses to
fairness are obvious. The challenges are not denied, but are confessed and
avoided on instrumental grounds. Critics question the accuracy and the
justice of the instrumental justification.
26.2.2.3 Class Actions: Where’s the Agreement?
Most cases are not eligible for one-way fee-shifting. Many claims remain
too small individually to support the high expenses of American litigation.
American lawyers have an answer for that, too: aggregate or class-action
litigation. Here a lawyer represents tens, hundreds or even thousands of
parties with claims. Sometimes claims are large, but litigation expenses too
high to handle them one-at-a-time. Sometimes claims are small, some as
small as a few dollars each. In a legal system that prizes case-by-case con-
sideration of each individual case, class action litigation seems strangely
out-of-place. For a fee system of unregulated fee agreements, a valid agree-
ment between one lawyer and a hundred or a thousand clients, each with
a claim of few dollars, is hard to find. Since 2003, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have required that courts, as part of their approval of class action
settlements, decide on the “reasonable attorneys’ fee” to be allowed.41
38 See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 25.
39 See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2051
n.48 (1993) (citing examples).
40 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 261–263 (1975).
41 Rule 23(h). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Settlement
of Class Actions, 1. J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167 (2009).
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26.2.3 Diversion of Undesirable Business
26.2.3.1 Self-Representation (Pro Se)
Self-representation (pro se) has been possible in the federal courts for as
long as they have been in existence. Federal law, first adopted in 1789,42
permits parties in federal court to “plead and conduct [their] own cases
personally.”43 The reality is, of course, that few people can do that satis-
factorily in any but the simplest of cases. This right is hardly meaningful
except in courts where the unrepresented are helped to represent them-
selves.44 That is true in some small claims courts. When proposals are made
to increase the upper level jurisdictional amounts in small claims courts,
litigation lawyers often lead the opposition.
The possibility of pro se representation, however, is essential to main-
taining the present system. If there were a rule of mandatory representa-
tion, the denial of justice to those who could not afford counsel would be
obvious and irrefutable. The American legal system would be compelled to
offer legal aid as of right. That happened in Germany. There, where lawyers
did not and do not regulate themselves, they were required to provide
counsel for free for those who could not afford lawyers.45
26.2.3.2 Legal Aid
To represent oneself in court where the opposing side is represented by
a lawyer takes special qualities which few people have. What are people
who lack those qualities to do when they have litigation that does not qual-
ify for contingent fee representation or one-way fee-shifting? Those claims
account for the vast majority of legal claims. They include most defense
cases, most cases for non-monetary relief, and most cases for amounts
below $100,000. In the United States, people with such claims must beg
for help. Unlike other legal systems, they have no claim of right to litigation
42 § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
43 28 U.S.C. §1654.
44 See generally THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE
MARCH 2005 SUMMIT (National Center for State Courts, 2005), available at www.ncsc.
org; Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 103 (2002); Drew Swank, Note and Comment: The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19
BYU J. PUB. L. 373 (2005); Nina Ingwer Van Wormer, Note: Help at Your Fingertips:
A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983
(2007).
45 See Heinrich Dittenberger, Fünfzig Jahre Deutscher Anwaltverein 1871/1921,
aus JW 1921, reprinted in 125 JAHRE DEUTSCHER ANWALTVEREIN: EIN ÜBERBLICK
(Deutscher Anwaltverein, ca. 1996); James R. Maxeiner, A Right to Legal Aid: The ABA
Model Access Act in International Perspective (March 17, 2011) available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791209.
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help.46 Many forego their legal rights simply because they cannot afford to
pay for them.
Legal aid, or rather the lack of legal aid, in the United States, demon-
strates the lawyer domination of the American system of costs and fees.
Who can blame the lawyers? Bluntly put, why should small business-
men want customers who cannot pay for their products? Who in modern
economies provides their goods or services to others for free?
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in both the United States and
Germany, lawyers represented the very poor without charge (in the United
States, in forma pauperis). In the United States, lawyers and judges ran the
system; they resisted requiring colleagues to work for free. When demand
for representation grew, the bar ignored it; private parties outside the legal
system had to provide the poor with legal services. In Germany, government
officials ran the system; they drafted lawyers to provide free representation
as their price for granting permission to practice. When demand for repre-
sentation grew, the bar pleaded for relief; the government provided that it
would pay for their work.47
26.3 The Shakespearean Question: Answers by Field, Nast,
and Shakespeare, and Another Question
The General Report begins its first substantive section with what it calls
a “Shakespearean Question”: “To shift or not to shift.” [1.2.1] It ends the
report with a provocative answer: “one can perhaps say that at least among
the common law jurisdictions, the United States has got it right after all: if
lawyer fees are unregulated, unpredictable, and high, shifting them to the
loser is so fraught with problems that it is better not to undertake it at all.”
[1.5.2] The answer assumes that fees are unregulated, unpredictable, and
high. They are, but they should not be.
The United States does not have it right. No indemnity, unregulated fee
agreements, and lawyer control of litigation, combine in a deadly cocktail
that poisons civil justice in America. Civil justice fails in its stated goal of
“just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceed-
ing.”48 It is not a reliable instrument for applying law to facts to resolve
disputes justly. Process considerations and party resources – rather than
law and justice – determine too many cases.
David Dudley Field, Jr. knew that. In 1842 he made the case for fee
shifting:
46 Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
47 See James R. Maxeiner, A Right to Legal Aid, supra note 45.
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See generally, MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 8.
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The losing party ought to indemnify the other as far as possible against his losses
by the suit. The former is in the wrong, the other is in the right; one ought not to
lose by the wrong of another. All men we believe have equal rights. Their abilities
to carry on lawsuits out of their own property are unequal. Unless then he who is
in the wrong is made to pay the full amount of his adversary’s expenses, just in
that proportion has the rich man an advantage over the poor one, and the rights
of the poor are unequally unprotected. If you would discourage unjust litigation,
you must make the unjust litigant indemnify his adversary.49
Nast too understood the pernicious products of allowing one side to gain the
upper hand through money. He reminded Field of that through an answer
he found in Shakespeare:
Plate sin with gold and the strong lance of justice hurtlessly breaks:
Arm it in rags, a pigmy’s straw doth pierce it.
King Lear, act IV, scene 6
Principals not Men – A Lawyer Pleading for his “Client”
“The Bar of (Obstruction). Law.”
Thomas Nast, HARPER’S WEEKLY MAGAZINE, August 7, 1875
49 Letter, supra note 4, at 56.
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26.4 Conclusion
The American experience is a lesson and a warning to other jurisdic-
tions that may be considering the American model of no fee shifting and
unregulated fee agreements.
The ultimate question that needs to be answered is not, “to shift or not
to shift.” It is, how can fee shifting and fee regulation be reconciled?
Deregulating fees, so notes the General Report, is intimately related to
shifting them. Some regulation of attorneys’ fees recoverable is essential
to loser pays. Otherwise, richer parties could win by outspending poorer
opponents and could compound the injustices of their victories by imposing
their attorneys’ fees as costs on the vanquished poor. Thus in New York
in 1840, Theodore Sedgwick, Field’s law office associate, in his loser-pays
system, limited fees shifted to those fees for “a lawyer of respectability” and
not those for a lawyer of “remarkable or extraordinary ability.”50 Field’s
preferred approach was a percentage of the amount of the recovery.51
If fees are shifted, however, clients expect that fees will be fully shifted
and that they will be fully compensated when they win. The Virginia leg-
islature saw that already in a statute of 1778: “it is, unreasonable that the
party who prevails . . . should be subject to the payment of a greater fee to
his lawyer than he can recover from the adverse party.”52 That is a direct
challenge to a lawyer of greater ability or, to a lawyer for a client with
greater means to pay. In the United State the bar regulates itself and the
lawyers that lead the bar are lawyers of greater ability who work for clients
of greater means. Small wonder that they championed a market approach
to fees while allowing fee shifting to disappear.
Although the American experience is a warning to the world, the dangers
elsewhere are not great as in the United States, since legal fees elsewhere
are not as unpredictable and usually also not as substantial. American fees
are so substantial only partly because American lawyers are self-regulated.
More important still is that American lawyers, through their control of liti-
gation, determine what fees will be. So long as they drive the legal system,
fees are likely to remain high.
50 THEODORE SEDGWICK, HOW SHALL THE LAWYERS BE PAID? OR SOME REMARKS UPON
TWO ACTS RECENTLY PASSED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE COSTS OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
IN A LETTER TO JOHN ANTHON (1840).
51 Field, Letter, supra note 4, at 57.
52 1778 Va. Acts, ch. 14, § 5, in A collection of all such public acts . . . as are now in
force 84 (Richmond 1785), reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 84
(J. Cushing comp. 1982), as cited in Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 11.
